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Language-based information flow control (IFC) promises to secure computer pro-
grams against malicious or incompetent programmers by addressing key shortcom-
ings of modern programming languages. In spite of showing great promise, the field
remains under-utilised in practise. This thesis makes contributions to the theoretical
foundations of IFC aimed at making the techniques practically applicable. The paper
addresses two primary topics, IFC as a library and IFC without false alarms. The con-
tributions range from foundational observations about soundness and completeness,
to practical considerations of efficiency and expressiveness.
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Information processing systems are everywhere. They connect us, assist us in our
daily lives, and underpin almost all important societal functions. We place trust in
computer programs to handle our personal data and to provide valuable functional-
ity. However, such systems are increasingly under attack. Malicious actors make
daily attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and, availability of im-
portant systems. In 2017 Americans saw their confidential credit and social security
details leak to the internet in the Equifax breach [25]. In the same year, European
nations were hit by devastating ransomware attacks that compromised the availabil-
ity and integrity of their national health services and other crucial infrastructure [22].
According to some statistics, 2017 was the worst year on record for data breaches,
totalling almost 1600 recorded incidents [50]. Other sources indicate a staggering
growth-rate for cyber crime in the last decade. In 2015 we saw around 150 incidents,
a number that grew to over 1000 in 2016 [17].
The year of 2018 also saw a number of high-profile attacks. The New York
Times reports that attackers were able to compromise the supply chain of a number of
newspapers [45]. The attacks highlight the need to defend against both data leakage,
attacks on confidentiality, and data corruption, attacks on integrity. Attacks against a
newspaper may leak confidential information, for example about anonymous sources.
Perhaps worse, attacks raise concerns about the risk that attackers may influence what
is printed on the physical paper or the newspaper’s website, a threat to integrity which
may erode trust in the news media as a whole.
Large organisations like the New York Times and Equifax are not alone in being
under attack. While attacks where a malicious entity gains access to a trustworthy
information processing system like that of the New York Times are severe and harm-
ful, incidents of attackers going after individuals are both more common and more
worrying. For a fictitious example of such a scenario, consider a smartphone appli-
cation, we call it Whelp, for suggesting nearby restaurants. For Whelp to be able
to provide this service, the application needs access to the user’s location. However,
while the user may have agreed to share their location with the application developer,
normally by granting the Whelp application access to the smartphone’s GPS sensor,
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they do not necessarily wish to disclose their location to all the third party developers
who may have contributed code in the form of software libraries or plugins used by
Whelp. However, once the user grants Whelp access to her location, all the code in
the Whelp application has access to the location and can use it at its own discretion.
This model, dubbed discretionary access control (DAC), is the de-facto standard
model in place in most phone and desktop operating systems. Unfortunately, it is
ill suited to ensure that sensitive information is used correctly within an application.
Once the application has access to the information, it is up to the programmer to
ensure that secrets do not leak. The DAC model places full trust in all the code of
the program, including all third party code imported through software libraries, plu-
gins, and in the case of websites running third party code in the user’s web-browser,
through dynamic web requests. Clearly, DAC is an inadequate security measure as
it gives no guarantee about the actual flow of sensitive information inside a system
[43]. To remedy this, we instead turn to Language-Based Information Flow Control
(IFC).
1.1 Language-Based Information Flow Control
Language-Based Information Flow Control (IFC) [43] is a collection of program-
ming language features and analyses, referred to as enforcement mechanisms, for
ensuring that information flow inside a system conforms to a formally stated security
policy. In the previous section we saw an example of a security policy: the user’s
location is allowed to flow to the main developers of Whelp, but not to authors of any
third party libraries. The policy is used in the IFC system to either statically or dy-
namically track information flow in programs and ensure that no secret information
can leak from the system.
A website login form provides another simple example of such a security policy.
In this context, a typical security policy says that text entered into the password field
is secret and should not flow, through a HTTP-request or any other means, to any
URL other than the domain of the website.
Security policies are not limited to specifying confidentiality requirements, like
password secrecy, but can also specify integrity constraints. Typically, integrity is
phrased in terms of preventing untrusted, public, inputs from affecting trusted, secret,
outputs. In this sense, integrity can be thought of as dual to confidentiality. For
example, a very common integrity security policy says that public, untrusted, input
should not be able to flow un-sanitised to an SQL query, as allowing it to do so could
cause an SQL injection vulnerability [41].
Formal Specification. In order to begin to mitigate these types of vulnerabilities,
it is important to be able to precisely specify what the intended behaviour of a system
is, and specifically to be able to specify what counts as secure or insecure system be-
haviour. A distinction between what behaviour is secure and not is typically referred
to as a “security policy”. Clearly, it is necessary to have a precise mathematical
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s := getSecret();
p := 0;








p := s + 1;
writeSecret(p);
(b)
Figure 1.1: An insecure and a secure program
language in which to express policies in order to be able to reliably enforce them.
In language-based IFC, the choice of language is that of (partial) orders of security
labels [19]. The order, written  and pronounced “can flow to”, stipulates that infor-
mation from an input channel, like the GPS sensor on a phone, labeled with security
label  can flow to an output channel, like a web domain, labeled ′ if and only if
  ′. Because information in a system can come from the combination of multi-
ple inputs, we usually require that the partial order comes equipped with some way
of combining security labels (unionsq), making it a security (join semi-) lattice [19]. The
canonical example of a security lattice is the two-point lattice with labels Public and
Secret where Public Secret but not the other way around.
Given this precisely stated security policy, Secret  Public, we consider the two
example programs 1.1a and 1.1b. According to our policy, program 1.1a is not se-
cure, as the secret input influences the value written to the public output, whereas
program 1.1b is.
Ensuring that information can not flow contrary to the security policy is a key
requirement of IFC enforcement mechanisms. This property is normally referred to
as soundness. Soundness means that the attacker observable behaviour of a program
for an attacker who can see outputs on channel a should not depend in any way on
input from a channel with a label that cannot flow to a. There are many possible
definitions of attacker observable behaviour. In the simplest case we only consider
the collective outputs of the terminated program attacker observable. We will adopt
this “batch-job” model of programs in the rest of this introduction and make only
minor modifications to it in order to account for some of the subtleties of program
termination. When phrased in terms of the two-point lattice from above, this means
that public output cannot depend on secret input, whereas secret output is allowed to
depend on both public and secret input. Other definitions include the attacker being
able to observe timing and termination behaviour in addition to the output of the
program [28].
In this model, specifying the power of an attacker means specifying only what we
mean by the observable behaviour of a program. This, in turn, gives rise to a sound-
ness condition. The general form of a soundness condition outlined above, observ-
able behaviour depends only on observable inputs, is referred to as Noninterference
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[44]. By varying the definition of observable behaviour, we obtain different variants
of the Noninterference condition. For example, when we do not consider termina-
tion observably different from non-termination, we get what is called Termination
Insensitive Noninterference (TINI). If, on the other hand, we consider termination an
observable behaviour, we instead get Termination Sensitive Noninterference (TSNI)
[28].
Formal Semantics. To make these notions precise, we need to understand the
formal semantics of programming languages. Semantics comes primarily in two
flavours, operational and denotational [40]. For now, we will focus on the opera-
tional variant, as this is designed to talk directly about how the state of a program
evolves under evaluation and therefore is closely related to actual implementations
of a programming language, a key to understanding the types of security concerns
that arise surrounding real code. We consider the notion of a configuration; in imper-
ative languages with side-effects, this is usually a program together with a store and
a model of the outside world. In purely functional lambda calculi, like the one we
consider in Chapter 5, a program configuration t is simply a term in the programming
language. A small-step operational semantics is a binary relation on configurations
written −→. We say that a configuration t “steps to” t ′ if t −→ t ′. We use t −→∗ t ′ to
say that t takes zero or more steps to get to t ′. In other words, −→∗ is the transitive
reflexive closure of −→ (see [40] for details). Configurations that are in a success-
fully terminated state and can no longer take a step are called values and are ranged
over by the variable v. The reader will find that the usual care has to be taken to not
conflate the definitions of a value and a stuck computation.
There are many ways of making the notion of observability precise, based both
on operational and denotational semantics [28, 31]. All definitions start with some
notion of programs, data, or program traces being -equivalent, written t1 ∼ t2. For
an example of low equivalence, consider a simple imperative language with configu-
rations (c,σ), where c is a program statement (command) and σ is a store that maps
memory locations to values. In this setting, similarity can be defined in terms of la-
bels assigned to the domain of σ , the program variables of c. Given some security
policy that assigns labels drawn from the security lattice to the program variables in
c, (c,σ1) ∼ (c,σ2) means that all the program variables with labels that can flow to
 are identical in σ1 and σ2.
In this formalism, we can state common definitions of TINI and TSNI in terms
of the diagrams in Figure 1.2. In these diagrams, and similar diagrams to come,
we use full and dashed lines to distinguish between the pre-condition of a definition
(t1 −→∗ v1) and the post-condition (v1 ∼ v2). In other words, Figure 1.2a says that
given terms t1 and t2 such that t1 ∼ t2 which reduce to values v1 and v2 respectively,
then it must be the case that v1 ∼ v2. Likewise, Figure 1.2b says that if term t1
reduces to a value v1, then any t2 such that t1 ∼ t2 must follow suit and reduce to a
value v2 such that v1 ∼ v2.
This definition of TINI can be rephrased as “given two programs which are iden-

























(b) A TSNI secure program
Figure 1.3: Security with respect to TINI and TSNI
tical from the point of view of , if both of them terminate then the results are identical
from the point of view of .” Similarly, TSNI can be thought of as “if t1 keeps run-
ning forever, then t2 keeps running forever, and if t1 terminates, so does t2 with an 
equivalent result.” For example, program 1.3a is secure with respect to TINI whereas
it is insecure with respect to TSNI. Program 1.3b, meanwhile, is secure with respect
to both TINI and TSNI.
There are two primary types of information flows that any sound enforcement
mechanism must track, explicit flows and implicit flows [20]. Explicit flow arises
when the value of a secret is directly copied from a secret source to a public sink.
Implicit flow, on the other hand, arises when the control-flow of the program is mod-
ified by a secret in a way which leaks to the public output of the program. This is the
type of flow we see in program 1.1a above.
The choice of what types of flows to monitor and prohibit influences the design
of the soundness criteria. For example, by only considering the leaks introduced by
explicit flows, we obtain variants on the criteria known as “explicit secrecy” [47].
These choices can then be combined with the choice of TINI vs. TSNI (and other,
more involved, variants [34, 28, 7]) to form complex soundness conditions.
The choice of soundness criterion depends on how and where an application
will be deployed. For example, in a highly concurrent setting like a web-server, a
TINI soundness criterion is insufficient to ensure secrets cannot be leaked quickly,
and so we require at least TSNI. To see why, consider that while each thread may
only leak a single bit via the termination channel, concurrent execution can leak
multiple different bits in parallel. Inside a smartphone, on the other hand, TINI may
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be sufficient to ensure that no sensitive information gets into the wrong hands quickly
[7]. In general, the choice of soundness criterion should be heavily influenced by the
attacker model and the environment in which the system will operate [12].
The particular soundness criterion that needs to be enforced in turn influences
the choice of enforcement mechanisms, as these are usually designed to guarantee
only one, or a handful, of such criteria. However, the design and choice of enforce-
ment techniques is not just decided by the soundness criterion. A security engineer
needs to consider many factors, like how trusted the programmer writing the code
is, and in what language the code is written. For example, if the code is written by
a trusted programmer in a type-safe language and the goal is to protect against an
attacker who is aiming to perform an SQL injection attack, it may be sufficient to
use a weak soundness condition like explicit secrecy [47]. In such a setting, a simple
enforcement technique like “taint tracking” may be enough [48]. However, when
attempting to protect sensitive information like cryptographic keys from an attacker
who is able to call your code multiple times, a stronger security condition like TSNI
may be adequate as TINI may leak one bit of sensitive information per run in poly-
nomial time [7]. In some cryptographic applications, it may even be necessary to
enforce a timing-sensitive [44] version of noninterference, to ensure the absence of
information leaks from timing.
Enforcement Mechanisms. Static IFC enforcement mechanisms are usually ap-
plied before code is run, either at the time of writing or when inspecting code before
running it (like when the browser downloads code from a website), and there are a
plethora of techniques based, for example, on type systems, theorem proving, and
even abstract interpretation [53, 37, 18, 11, 23]. Static labels on input and output
channels are used to approximate an upper bound on “how secret” an expression,
variable, or control flow of a program is. These upper bounds are then used to reject
potentially insecure program outputs and behaviours. For example, the program 1
a should be rejected because the program variable p, which is written to the public
output, depends on secret input through the control flow of the program. Similarly,
if we wish to statically enforce TSNI, the program 1.3a should be rejected on the
grounds that the termination behaviour depends on the secret input.
Statically deciding whether or not to reject a program whose looping behaviour
depends on secret input is difficult. It is well known that program termination is an
undecidable problem. As a consequence, any sound static enforcement mechanism
for TSNI will reject some secure programs [20].
We say that an enforcement mechanism that rejects or somehow changes the
semantics of secure programs is opaque. A mechanism that does not suffer from
such issues is called transparent. Naturally, there are no transparent entirely static
enforcement mechanisms [20].
Opacity risks hindering the adoption of IFC tools. There are two primary ar-
guments for why this is the case. The first argument is theoretical; many systems
include legacy code which was not written with IFC enforcement mechanisms in
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mind. Staicu et al. [49] have shown that it is unlikely that such code will, in general,
be written in a way which conservative IFC enforcement mechanisms will accept.
The second argument is more practical, Alpernas et al. [6] argue that while some
modern programming domains do not suffer from opacity, some modern distributed
systems require transparent enforcement mechanisms in order to ensure soundness.
In conclusion, adding complexity to the software engineering process by introduc-
ing limitations on the kind of program the system will accept is likely to hinder
widespread adoption of static IFC techniques which lack transparency.
However, one alternative to static enforcement, which aims to reduce false alarms,
is dynamic enforcement. A dynamic enforcement mechanism works by modifying
the behaviour of a program either by modifying the runtime system of the program-
ming language itself, or the environment in which it is executing. All dynamic sys-
tems work by, in some way or another, carrying around information about what in-
puts have influenced the control flow of the program and the value of the program
variables.
Tracking explicit flow is relatively straight-forward to do both statically [33, 35,
53, 55] and dynamically [48]. However, statically tracking implicit flows requires
more finesse in order to avoid a large false-positive rate (a high number of secure
programs being rejected) [32]. The difference between the difficulty of tracking ex-
plicit and implicit flows statically can be put down to explicit flows being a syntactic
property computable in polynomial time, and implicit flows being a non-trivial, and
therefore undecidable [42], semantic property. Dynamic enforcement mechanisms
do not fare much better. In order to be sound, they need to be overly conservative
about branches that have not been taken by the program when tracking implicit flows
[10], which leads to opacity.
1.2 Barriers to Adoption for Language Based IFC and the
Role of this Thesis
While the literature on language based IFC is extensive, including tools, custom pro-
gramming languages, and software libraries designed to aid application of IFC tech-
niques to real code, the field faces a number of challenges. Despite some lightweight
techniques for taint tracking seeing large scale application [48], the field as a whole
remains under-utilised in practice. In this thesis, I identify and work to address
two major challenges hindering the adoption of IFC techniques to real-world code
through both theoretical and practical contributions.
The first barrier to entry is the need for custom languages and tooling. While
many IFC systems have been built as extensions to common, established, program-
ming languages like Java or JavaScript, these come in the form of specialised tools
like static type checkers or runtime systems [36, 26]. In some cases, the IFC “ver-
sion” of a language represents a significant departure from the original language [14].
As a consequence, some engineering and design effort still remains in order to inte-
grate these techniques into existing language standards and tools.
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One approach to reducing this gap between academic and industrial implementa-
tions is the idea of IFC as a library championed by Russo among others [53, 24, 52,
51, 29, 39, 16, 2]. In this approach, IFC systems are embedded wholesale into an ex-
isting programming language in the form of a software library. In this thesis, I make
extensive use of this technique and every chapter, each based on an published paper,
is accompanied by a Haskell implementation of the proposed technique or system.
The thesis consists of five different chapters:
1. Encoding DCC in Haskell - M. Algehed and A. Russo (PLAS 2017) [4]
2. A Perspective on the Dependency Core Calculus - M. Algehed (PLAS 2018)
[2]
3. Simple Noninterference from Parametricity - M. Algehed and J.P. Bernardy
(ICFP 2019) [3]
4. Faceted Secure Multi Execution - T. Schmitz, M. Algehed, A. Russo, and C.
Flanagan (CCS 2018) [46]
5. Optimising Faceted Secure Multi-Execution - M. Algehed, A. Russo, and
C. Flanagan (CSF 2019) [5]
IFC as a library. In Chapters 1 and 2, we demonstrate that the “IFC as a library”
approach possesses large expressive power even when built on top of very small foun-
dations. Using a trusted computing base of only 7 lines of Haskell, we are able to
build a library that supports a wide variety of features by using Haskells advanced
type system and functional purity. The main idea is to embed the Dependency Core
Calculus (DCC) of Abadi et al. [1] and force all sensitive information to be chaper-
oned by the DCC implementation
The main advantage of this technique is that the difficult part of incorporating
effects like state and exceptions into a security library, combining multiple different
effectful computations at different security levels in a sound way, is handled by the
underlying implementation of DCC. In previous work, this combination of different
effects and security levels is made a trusted (although proven correct) part of the
implementation [53, 51, 54, 15]. However, when using our approach these primitives
become derived operations whose correctness follows from the correctness of the
encoding.
While the IFC as a library technique is promising, it leaves a gap between theory
and practice. In order to prove that the implementation of the IFC system is sound,
authors usually construct a model of the library as a separate program calculus and
prove soundness for that calculus, rather than the actual implementation [53]. Given
the current state of the art in Haskell verification, this is an unavoidable shortcoming
of their work.
However, in Paper 3 we look forward and develop a technique for verifying the
implementation of an IFC library directly in the host language. Although this is
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Figure 1.4: Two similar programs, one is secure and the other is not.
done only for a core IFC library embedded in a language much more expressive than
Haskell, it represents a step towards closing the gap between theory and practice.
Others have also recognised the power of this approach. For example, Jung et al.
[30] present the Iris framework, a similar approach which allows reasoning about
libraries using expressive language-specific meta theory.
Transparency. The second issue hindering the widespread adoption of IFCmethod-
ologies is the opacity introduced by, for example, imprecise handling of implicit
flows. The vast majority of IFC enforcement mechanisms and systems are not trans-
parent, and as such cannot be applied “out of the box” to secure third-party or legacy
code not written with the enforcement mechanism in mind. In order to measure the
extent of this problem, King et al. [32] employ a variant of the Jif [36] static IFC
analysis tool for Java to find information leaks in real Java code. While their analysis
revealed a large number of implicit flows (145 out of 162 of detected actual leaks
were due to implicit flows) over 90% of the implicit flows reported by the system as
possible leaks were false alarms.
To understand why opacity has the potential to be so devastating, consider pro-
grams 1.4a and 1.4b. Program 1.4a is clearly insecure and is rightly rejected by any
sound IFC system. Program 1.4b, on the other hand, is not insecure and so should
not be rejected. However, typing this program into JSFlow, an IFC aware JavaScript
runtime [27], causes it to halt execution before the last line when the secret is equal
to 1 in order to prevent information about the secret from “leaking” to the public
output. While this program is rejected by JSFlow due to it employing the so-called
“No Sensitive Upgrade” (NSU) strategy to deal with implicit flows, the program is
accepted by systems based on “Permissive Upgrade” (PU) [8]. Although PU offers
some relief, many secure programs are still rejected by this strategy [8, 9].
This behaviour may be deemed acceptable when considering programs like 1.4a
and 1.4b that do not compute anything useful. One could argue that no real code
looks like this. However, in Paper 5 we show that there are programs that, when
written without enforcement in mind, display problematic behaviour similar to that
of program 1.4b. For example, when data records of different security levels are kept
in the same data structure, like an event queue or a hash table, patterns similar to the
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one in 1.4b arise naturally.
The definition of transparency says that “An IFC enforcement technique is trans-
parent if it does not alter the semantics of secure programs.” There are two parts
to this definition, the definition of a secure program and the definition of “alter the
semantics”. Both these concepts will be made precise in Papers 4 and 5, where we
prove that two related enforcement mechanisms are both transparent. For now, we
will only cover the technical definitions briefly.
A program is secure with respect to a security policy if for all , given any two
inputs t1 and t2 such that t1 ∼ t2, the program behaves securely with respect to the
soundness condition when running without the enforcement mechanism. Formally,
this means that given a “standard semantics” (−std →), the TSNI diagram holds
with t t1 and t t2 and −std→ instead of −→. The standard semantics is also what
provides us with the definition of “alter the semantics”, an enforcement mechanism
does not alter the semantics of a program if the result of executing under−std→ and
−→ look the same to an observer at level , for all  for which the program behaves
securely. Using diagrams, the definition can be stated as the following implication















The examples above make the need for transparent IFC clear and highlight its
dual purpose. Transparency both allows IFC to be applied to third party or legacy
code, and ensures the security conscious programmer is not forced to program in an
awkward or peculiar style. It is clear that providing transparent IFC is an important
aspect of practical language-based security.
Multi-Execution. In the literature, however, there are only a handful of enforce-
ment mechanisms for ensuring transparency, collectively known as “multi-execution”
techniques. As the name suggest, the idea is to run copies of the same program, or
parts of the program, multiple times while altering the input and output behaviour in
each run. One early example of this is Secure Multi-Execution (SME) [21]. Under
SME, one copy of the program is run for each security level. Security is achieved by
giving each copy only the inputs that are visible at its level and using only the outputs
to channels labeled with the label of that copy of the program. In the special case of
the two-point lattice of public and secret discussed above, SME runs two copies of
the program called the public and private runs. The public run is not given the true
secret input, rather some default values, and is made to only produce public output.
The secret run on the other hand is given both the public and secret input, but is only
made to produce secret output. A diagram showing the operation of SME for this lat-
tice with public denoted by the colour blue and secret by red can be found in Figure
1.2. BARRIERS TO ADOPTION FOR LANGUAGE BASED IFC AND THE
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p
p
Figure 1.5: Secure Multi-Execution of the program p for the two-point lattice.
// Public run
s := readSecret(); //s = 0






s := readSecret(); //s = 1
p := 0; //p = 0
if s then




1.5. The simplicity of SME means that it lends itself naturally to a black-box ap-
proach, which can, in theory, be applied to any program written in any programming
language.
To see how SME works, consider running program 1.4b above with secret input
1. The two runs we get can be seen in Figure 1.6. In the public run, the secret input
is given the default value 0 and the public output is 0. In the secret run, however,
because we are computing with the actual value of the secret, the public output is
blocked. Because the program is secure, the output when running under SME is the
same as when running without any enforcement mechanism. If instead of running
program 1.4b, we run program 1.4a, an insecure program, the public output would
be unaffected by the actual value of the secret, ensuring security.
In contrast to traditional static and dynamic enforcement techniques, SME does
not provide any means of detecting attacks. Rather, SME is a form of “program-
repair”, it does not detect vulnerabilities but automatically creates a secure program
from any source program.
While SME is an attractive technique, it suffers a number of drawbacks addressed
in follow-up work [9, 38]. SME often requires an excessive number of executions of
the same program and fails to work for security lattices with a large or infinite set of
labels. For example, several billion labels would be required to provide every user of
the social media site Facebook with their own label, making SME a poor fit for this
domain.
The limitations of SME prompted Austin and Flanagan to develop Multiple Facet
(MF) semantics [9]. Under MF, each program is run with multiple values associated
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to each variable, one for each security level which may have influenced the variable.
This allows MF to be transparent while being less computationally demanding than
full SME. However, it fails to provide the same security guarantees, providing Termi-
nation Insensitive security while SME provides Termination Sensitive security [13].
Another drawback of MF compared to SME is that MF is not black-box, as it requires
modifying the core semantics of the programming language.
Motivated by the subtly different expressive power, security guarantees, and per-
formance characteristics of SME and MF, in Paper 4 we introduce Multef, a unifying
theoretical and practical framework for multi-execution. Multef provides a novel ap-
proach to MF and SME, as well as a new execution mode we call Faceted Secure
Multi-Execution (FSME) which subsumes both MF and SME and provides a “best
of both worlds” approach in terms of performance and security guarantees. Using
Multef, we implement a number of case studies and micro benchmarks to show how
the performance characteristics of MF, SME, and FSME differ. Multef is imple-
mented using the IFC as a library approach, and therefore benefits greatly from the
expressive power of the Haskell language.
This expressive power allows us to build case studies that increase our under-
standing of the limitations of multi-execution. Motivated by our findings, in Paper
5, we show how naively applying multi-execution incurs significant performance
penalties. In the paper, we provide two types of optimisation techniques, dubbed
data- and computation-oriented optimisation, which can be employed to reduce over-
head introduced by FSME and Faceted databases. In the best case, data-oriented
optimisation reduces overheads from exponential to constant space and time with-
out the interaction of the programmer, thereby fulfilling the promise of transparent
IFC. Computation-oriented optimisation, on the other hand, relies on the insight that
transparent IFC may be too much to ask for in some cases, and instead allows the pro-
grammer to insert annotations that help the runtime system reduce overheads. One
key insight of this work is that the original formulation of transparent IFC is too rigid
to accommodate for our optimisation techniques. In order to remedy this issue we
provide a new, stronger, notion of transparency.
Conclusion. In summary, Papers 1, 2, and 3 provide novel insights into the nature
of the “security as a library” approach. In particular, Paper 3 shows how to use ex-
isting meta-theoretical tools to reason about the implementation of a security library
without appealing to an external model of the library. In Papers 4 and 5, meanwhile,
we strengthen the foundations of transparent IFC. Specifically, 4 provides a unifying
formal framework in which to study the trade-offs between MF, SME, and FSME
and 5 uses this framework to highlight and fix key performance issues present in all
multi-execution techniques.
Future Work. For security as a library, the goal is to extend the techniques from
Paper 3 to full-blown programming languages. I am hopeful that this can be achieved
by incorporating ideas like those of the Iris framework [30].
1.2. BARRIERS TO ADOPTION FOR LANGUAGE BASED IFC AND THE
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For transparent IFC I am less hopeful. It appears unlikely to me that the tech-
niques from Paper 5 will extend far enough to deal with all performance issues in-
troduced by multi-execution. Specifically, I doubt that it will be possible to find
algorithms for deriving optimal multi-execution patterns like those presented for the
case studies in the paper automatically. In fact, I consider it important future work
to explore the limits of multi-execution and transparent IFC. I will conduct this work
with the goal of better understanding when transparency can be achieved efficiently,
and when it is necessary to coerce application programmers into using more intrusive
approaches like runtime monitors and static analysis.
14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.3 Statement of Contributions
Encoding DCC inHaskell It was Alejandro Russo’s idea to encode DCC in Haskell.
The key idea of using type families was mine. The technical development was per-
formed by me. Both authors contributed to the writing, with Alejandro’s primary role
being to provide feedback on my writing and structure.
Simple Noninterference from Parametricity The idea behind the paper and the
technical development were both mine. Jean-Philippe contributed the key insight of
using Sigma types and performed the Agda mechanisation of the core parametricity
proof. The mechanisation of the translation of DCC into Agda was done by both
authors jointly.
A Perspective on the Dependency Core Calculus This is a single author paper, I
did all the work on my own.
Faceted Secure Multi Execution Thomas and I shared the majority of the techni-
cal work and the writing equally. I was mainly responsible for the implementation
and evaluation of the Multef tool and case studies. The initial prototype implemen-
tation was done by Alejandro, while subsequent rewrites of the framework and re-
structuring to greatly simplify the presentation were performed by me.
Optimising Faceted Secure Multi-Execution Alejandro and I jointly came up
with the idea of doing tree-rewriting. The idea of limiting views during computation
came frommy implementation of a chat server inMultef. The technical development,
including proofs, implementation, and type-setting were done by me. The majority
of the writing was done by me, Alejandro and Cormac provided useful feedback and
input on the entire writing process.
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